Doctor in sociology and a researcher at CEAQ (Centre d’Etude sur l’Actuel et le Quotidien) of the Sorbonne University Paris Descartes, he is a lecturer at the Sorbonne, the founder and head of the GRIS (Groupe de Recherche sur l’Image en Sociologie).

Este trabajo se propone discutir el concepto kantiano de Ilustración en un triple aspecto: 1) la noción de saber implícita en el uso del lema sapere aude, referida no al conocimiento , sino a una noción de razón que culmina en la sabiduría (Weisheit.

Am 26. Dezember 2005, einen Tag vor seinem 74. Geburtstag, starb Silvestro Marcucci, Erster Vorsitzender der „Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani“, sowie Begründer und Herausgeber der Zeitschrift „Studi kantiani“. Sein Tod kam gänzlich unerwartet in einer Zeit, da er, seit dem 31. Oktober 2005 frei von akademischen Verpflichtungen, seine wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit fortsetzte, vielleicht mit noch größerer Freude und mehr Engagement als zuvor. Die letzten Wochen seines Lebens waren mit dem Gedanken an der Organisation des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 2010 erfüllt, der (...) nach dem Beschluss der Kant-Gesellschaft im Oktober 2005 von der Società di studi kantiani in Pisa veranstaltet werden wird. Marcucci trug wie kaum ein anderer dazu bei, der italienischen Kant-Forschung, die ohnehin schon lange internationale Anerkennung gewonnen hat, ein prägnantes Profil zu verleihen: er hatte die Fähigkeit, die zahlreichen italienischen Forscher einem intensiveren wissenschaftlichen Austausch und dadurch zu neuen Leistungen zuzuführen. (shrink)

Au xviie siècle, la dévotion à l’Enfant Jésus connaît un essor sans précédent. Cette spiritualité de l’Enfance s’articule autour des notions d’anéantissement, d’abnégation et d’abandon à Dieu, avec des âmes soumises dans des corps maîtrisés. Les chrétiens doivent s’identifier au Christ enfant, vivre dans la pauvreté, le dénuement et la dépendance qui était celle de l’enfant dans la crèche. Les femmes n’ont guère de mal à se reconnaître dans ce divin Enfant décrit comme « petit », faible et dépendant. Mais, (...) une fois « abandonnées à Dieu », elles donnent – littéralement – corps à l’Enfant Jésus et prennent la parole en son nom. Ainsi, loin du silence du nourrisson, les femmes utilisent cette forme de dévotion comme un moyen d’expression et de reconnaissance sociale. (shrink)

This article discusses the account of Kant's view of concept formation that Alberto Vanzo has put forward in "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" (Trento: Verifiche, 2012).

The article addresses some aspects of Gava’s book, highlighting two main points: (1) the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense; (2) its connection with the meaning of the concept of method. Regarding (1) I show how Gava’s interpretation of the systematic concept of philosophy does not account adequately for the scholastic concept. This has consequences for the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense itself; its nature as an objective archetype and its personification in the ideal of a master (...) of wisdom are not properly emphasized. These features are closely related to Kant’s claim that philosophy cannot be learned, which is connected with Kant’s peculiar idea of method. Regarding (2), I argue that ‘method’ for Kant does not concern only the construction of scientific systems, but also the establishment of a way of thinking, a stance embracing thought and action. The meaning of the postulates and the notion of ‘faith’ thus acquire a ‘weaker’ connotation, as an attitude, habitus, aimed at the establishment and promotion of a ‘life-structuring’ rationality, and not as an alternative route to a theoretical ‘commitment’. (shrink)

With the Science of Logic, Hegel poses a radical challenge to philosophy: a self-presentation of thought that, by not assuming anything outside itself, achieves its self-knowledge. From the possibility of such a project depends that of the autonomy of thought, that is, of a thought that gives itself its own law.Some classical readings consider this enterprise to be unsuccesful or not to be fully accomplished in the Logic. According to Dieter Henrich, Hegel's Logic would fall into a circle, because would (...) be burdened by the presupposition of the structure of thought itself, which should rather result from the logical process. For Robert B. Pippin or Terry Pinkard, instead, the instance of autonomy of thought would be realized not in the logic, but only at the level of the spirit.In contrast to such interpretations, we will try to show that precisely in the Logic the thought determines itself as autonomous. In its self-presentation thought, that has itself as its object, produces its own structures, which are not prior to the movement. And once it has come to know itself as such a process, thought ceases to presuppose itself as an object and poses its own form for itself. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss the basic concepts developed in Ferraris’ book Documentalità, in particular the first two items of the conceptual triad trace-registration-inscription. The alleged priority of icnology on semiotics can hardly be justified; due to the overlooking of the notions of rule and code, the law of the production of traces remains obscure. On the other hand, the notion of registration as presence of traces in the mind conflicts whit some of our knowledge about the (...) brain and cannot avoid a logical circularity, since the trace is defined as something which can exist only if a mind is recognizing it as such. (shrink)

Kant ha subrayado el carácter problemático del auto-conocimiento en el campo de la antropología y la psicología: desde sus primeras obras insistió en la imposibilidad de conocer con certeza, sobre la base de las acciones, la disposición moral subjetiva, la única que da a la acción un valor moral. Esta dificultad no se atenúa cuando el juicio moral es dirigido sobre el sujeto mismo. A los problemas cognitivos se añade una tendencia al auto-engaño que está activa en toda la vida (...) moral. Si se mantiene la importancia de este argumento, puede emerger una caracterización de la Gesinnung que la distingue de cualquier “intención” subjetiva. Aquella puede ser concebida más bien como una estructura “objetiva”, independiente de la conciencia subjetiva y análoga a una idea regulativa, que obliga a interpretar las acciones morales sobre la base de un principio que es necesario asumir, pero que no es posible conocer. (shrink)